Clarifying the Muddy Waters 

Excellent!  

I was looking for precisely this kind of an opportunity for a serious dialogue. Criticism is most welcome when it is on substance, as yours is. It is the only way forward in advancing thinking. My article has clearly failed to communicate with you. I will try and respond to your questions as best as I can and then take the discussion forward through further comments from you and colleagues. We are only beginning.... I hope.  

You did not ask me to give my definition of Capitalism but I have done this because Capitalism is the most important of modern day religions. 

Was I writing fiction? Absolutely not! The topic is extremely serious for me and I was (and am) genuinely concerned about the analytical rigour and validity of my arguments. The reason I chose the fictional flourish was to highlight the contrast between the “fundamentalism” in thinking and its avowed denial by most ideologues of all persuasions. It would not be much news to demonstrate that religious fundamentalists are religious fundamentalists; that is why I chose the prototype of those who are in denial of their fundamentalism as the starting point for demonstrating that religious fundamentalism is a far more common streak than we would care to believe and that it pervades all ideologies.     

I define the words “religion” and “fundamentalism” and other “ISMS” and “ISTS” in a very particular way, which I will detail, but let me first explain my motivation for introducing a different approach to defining these commonly known terms.  

The question I was trying to answer is whether the differences in ideologies come from the differences in their fundamental premise, or from the differences in the sub-structure of values and norms they imply. This led me to seek if there is a common thread to the ideologies. I think I have found such a common thread.  

If this common thread is accepted as an accurate and meaningful description, it can shed new light on the comparative analysis of ideologies when applied to particular contexts. By identifying the common thread one can get away from accepting or rejecting the labels and the covers and can focus on the content of the ideologies instead.  

I question the traditional definitions because they focus on the wrong things (labels) and draw wrong causal relationships (because they do not focus on the content and behavioural implications). Furthermore, the traditional definitions of religion have acquired a large degree of emotive content (the very labels charge people up) and this detracts attention from their content and implications, and impedes comparative analysis.  

I propose an alternative, value-neutral definition of religions. It forces people to judge religions not on the basis of their starting premise but on the implications of the premise. You may call this a ‘historicist” or “positivist” or a “behaviourist” approach. What it says is this: you can choose any assumptions you like for your worldview; these assumptions are by definition not open to questioning and must be taken on faith. What can be questioned and critically examined, however, are their implications for the norms of human behaviour and individual conduct in society. These are open to questioning on a rational basis of agreed criteria and therefore these alone should be the focus in a comparative analysis. 

Religion  

In most Western thinking the word religion is restricted to the three so-called revealed religions of the Middle East. Most such writers do not even want to categorise Hinduism or Buddhism as a religion. Currently, the common Western usage would include Hinduism but perhaps some may not include Confucius principles or Taoism and even Buddhism. This kind of a definition of religion is a typically Western ethnocentric Judeo-Christian approach. It confuses faith and spiritualism with a revealed book. It uses the primary criterion as the presence or absence of (a monotheistic) divine entity called God. Users of this type of definition often have typically regarded the so-called lesser religions as “cults” rather than as religions. In many other lands, such as in India, the equivalent terms for religion (Dharma) is used in a much broader context that clearly includes a set of cultural practices, which may or may not be in a written form.    

My definition of Religion  

I find the commonly used Western definition of the term religion in the West very unsatisfactory. First, it is extremely narrow (limited to only to the so-called divinely inspired religions). Second, it fails to capture the essence of religion or the religious approach – the use of a starting premise based on blind faith. Third, by using such a narrow definition it fails to provide guidance for comparative analysis.  

In contrast, I define religion as a framework or a worldview, which people accept on faith, and which offers a set of values translated into norms of behaviour that the believers use as a guide for action in a range of real life situations. The worldview implied by a religion necessarily has implications for what is “good’ and what is “bad”, and it has explicit or implicit prescriptions for how an individual should behave in society. The worldview is also used to forge an identity of the believer. 

The term accepting “on faith” means accepting an overarching fundamental principle or objective whose “why” is not open to question through the principles of scientific reasoning and proof verifiability and ’falsifiability’. The key criterion is that a religion exists when its fundamental and overarching principle is accepted “on faith” as the highest principle for setting the framework and deriving the values and norms.  

A religion in my sense may not have an overt God, but it always has an implicit highest authority, even if it is only a principle, which is accepted blindly, and therefore I regard it as Godhead, virtual or incarnate.  A religion always has books and prophets that are regarded more or less as sacred. It has priests and evangelists. It gives an identity to its adherents. It believes that it has found the Truth, which provides a path to salvation defined in its particular way. Because of its being the owner of the Truth, a religion is usually divisive, even though all religions start by claiming to be universal and inclusive.    

It should also be understood that the implications of the worldview for norms and behaviour are not static; they may change radically over time. Despite this change, it would still remain as part of the same religion, if the believers think so. For example, modern day Communism in China has completely revised the original tenets of community ownership but is still called Communism by its adherent. In other words, there is no necessary and fixed one-to-one mapping between the highest principles, which is taken on faith, and the recipes it offers (values and norms of practice) for conducting life.  

My definition of the term religion applies only to the first principles. Its derivatives or recipes for behaviour are subject to questioning and interpretations and, in practice quite flexible. But a religion exists if its first principle is accepted on faith. 

Fundamentalism 

In common parlance, this term applies to the use of literal definition of some religious doctrines, phrases or words, where the religion itself is defined in the narrow Western sense identified above. Historically it was used for people who went to the roots of the matter in the religious context.  

My definition of Fundamentalism  

I define Fundamentalism with a much broader coverage, consistent with my broader definition of religion. Hence, if Secularism is a religion, people sticking to some root or original meaning of a principle, phrase or a concept of Secularism will, in my definition be Fundamentalist Secularists.  The key point is that my definition applies to a particular approach that is not limited to the adherents of a particular religion but to all fields where an individual or institution sticks to literal and inflexible definitions of some overarching principle. Those Marxist who continue to believe in Marx’s prediction that the proletariat revolution must come first in advanced capitalistic societies, would be a Fundamentalist Communist in my view. A Mao who reinterprets the Marxist-Leninist doctrine for the agrarian societies would not be a Fundamentalist Communist on my definition. However, if someone was using Mao’s words literally and refuses its further reinterpretation that person would be a Fundamentalist Communist in this particular context.  

Communism 

The common understanding of this term lies in its advocacy of the dictatorship of the proletariat based on collective ownership of the means of production. This advocacy is based on Marx’s theory of materialist interpretation of history, embellished by many other doctrines from Lenin, Trotsky and others.  

Why I define Communism as religion? 

Regardless of the fact that theory of Communism has roots in pioneering economic analysis Marx conducted at the time Communism was being shaped, Communism is a religion because it has an ultimate, overarching principle at its base. This principle is the end state of history signalled by the dictatorship of the proletariat, arising out of materialist dialectics. I define Communism as a religion because Marx himself said that his advocacy of the Communist Manifesto is based more on emotion rather than on scientific logic. In my view, the religion of Communism has a principle as its Godhead that has to be taken on faith by the believers. It has its idea of redemption (a permanent end state of history), its sacred books, its many prophets and its vast array of evangelists.  And it surely endows identity on its believers.  

Secularism 

This is a very amorphous term with many different meanings. In its simplest form, it is defined as pertaining to the historical, material time, whose experience is sifted through the use of rationalism. It is defined in opposition to the spiritual, which is itself a very woolly and vague term. In practical terms, Secularism advocates that matters of state should not be conducted on the basis of faiths professed by its citizens but should be based on a common consensus based on the historical experience of its citizens.   

My definition of Secularism as religion 

The principle of conducting the business of the state on the basis of historical experience, and not becoming a hostage to the faith of any particular group, is eminently sensible. However, Secularism has two conceptual loopholes.  

First, the boundary line between what is temporal and what is spiritual is meaningless – for me, all that is called “spiritual” has a historical or temporal basis; and all that is called intuitive is the distillation of a rational process. So, for example, the Ten Commandments of Moses, supposedly provided directly by God Himself, or any other divine book coming from on high, are for me the work distilled out of man’s temporal experience. They are secular for me because they are conditioned in human time and space and come through a human medium.  

Second, by denying the role of the so-called spiritual faiths in the conduct of the state it appears as if Secularism is operating in a state of moral vacuum. In reality, it uses all the moral precepts of the faiths of the dominant groups of its citizens. In Western countries, the adoption of Secularism may deny Judeo-Christianity as religions but the fact remains that it has taken most of its moral precepts as the basis of statecraft. Most European states claim to be secular but most have the Christian cross in their flags – the umbilical chords are plainly visible. Most European countries have secular political parties that often include Christian in their name, such as the Christian Democrats in Germany. The secular United States has “In God We Trust” on its coins, and God Bless You as a necessary password for entering the hearts of the secular citizens. Western Secular nations may deny the importance of Christ’s birth but they dare not legislate against celebrating Christmas. Hence, there is a manifest contradiction in Secularism: it denies the role of non-secular knowledge but it draws upon all the acquired moral principles based on the so-called faiths.  

I define Secularism as a religion if it says that it is based only on “rationalism”. This is because the limitations of reason as a guide for human action have been amply demonstrated at least since the days of Kant. Perhaps rationalism is the best basis available to man, which I believe to be the case, but believing in something that is known to be faulty cannot be described as other than blind faith.  When the American Constitution talks about the “self-evident truths”, it recognises that these are a matter of “faith” for which rational justification is not required.  Secular states, therefore, are based on so-called faiths and Secularism falls in my definition of being a religion.  

Humanism 

The Humanistic movements date back to the Enlightenment and comprise many different strands ranging from greater emphasis on the use of rationalism to shifting the focus from the so-called God to the individual human being. Since you call yourself a “Humanist”, you must be aware of the many different strands of Humanism, its different “Shariah” if you like.  

My definition of Humanism as religion 

Whatever definition you use, I suspect there will be a non-verifiable principle at its heart. Hence, I would describe “Humanism” as a religion IF it starts with an overarching principle such as – let’s put the individual at the centre – which has to be taken on faith. It is a religion because it seems to give its adherents this particular faith, based on its definition of the “Truth”. It has its sacred books, which are accepted on faith. It has its prophets and its priests. It operates a network of believers in Humanism. It gives its adherents an identity that comes from possessing the Truth. It may even have its evangelists as well, which can be observed in its vehement efforts to distance itself from the so-called God-based faiths.   

As my definition of “religion” is value-neutral, it does not question that “putting man at the centre of things” is not a good idea. All that my definition is saying is that taking a non-verifiable, non-falsifiable principle as the starting point places Humanism in the category of religions.  

If the key thing about Humanism is that it is individual focused rather than God focused, then it defines itself as something in opposition to something else rather than proposing an identity of its own. It therefore suffers from all the same conceptual problems as Secularism. If it is based on a purely rationalistic approach then, again, it suffers from the conceptual incompatibilities experienced by Secularism.  

Capitalism as religion 

You did not ask me to give my definition of Capitalism but it is by far the most powerful of modern day religions for which ordinary individuals and not so ordinary states, alike, are willing to go to war and sacrifice lives. 

This powerful religion has spawned many different Shariahs but common to most is its belief that individual liberty is inalienably linked to private property ownership; that economic and political freedom are indivisible; that the Shariah of free markets is the best route to achieving this salvation; and the right to bear arms is the means to defend it.  

The Capitalist religion has prophets and saints, sacred books and well articulated Shariahs. Its pre-eminent prophet is the appropriately named Adam Smith, who was a professor of Moral Philosophy. Capitalism’s galaxy of prophets includes such luminaries as Hobbes and Locke. It has a host of minor saints and priests, down to this day, who are known by the unattractive title of neo-classical economists. Among this group there was this well-known reformist priest known as Lord Keynes, who attempted to show that pure free market system cannot escape periodic disasters and that governments must intervene to achieve permanent economic salvation.     

Hope this clarifies the muddy definitional waters. At any rate, it should provide sufficient basis for your comments on (i) whether the definitions I use are rigorous and clearly articulated; and (ii) whether they are useful for comparative purposes?

Abrar Hasan

3 August, 2009